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ARE AIRPORT SEARCHES STILL REASONABLE?
TEMPLE B. INGRAM, JR.
A LTHOUGH the subject of airport security systems has in-
spired much comment in legal literature,' most of the discus-
sion has dealt with initial security systems which consisted of use
of the "hijacker profile," metal detector' screening, identification
request, and "Terry-type" frisk." Few of the commentators, how-
ever, have addressed current procedures which dispense with the
use of the profile, and subject all passengers (or persons entering
the secure portion of the airport) to a metal detector, and to X-ray
search of their hand luggage. Most of the earlier writings, as well
as the early cases, focused on the Terry rationale to reconcile the
screening procedures with the fourth amendment.' This is clearly
'See, e.g., McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures, A Reasonable
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293 (1972); Gora, The Fourth Amendment at
the Airport: Arriving, Departing, or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036 (1973);
McClintock, Skyjacking: Its Domestic Civil and Criminal Ramifications, 39 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 29 (1973); Maurer, Skyjacking and Airport Security, 39 J. AIR
L. & COM. 361 (1973); Andrews, Screening Travelers at the Airport to Prevent
Hijacking: A New Challenge for the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 16
ARiz. L. REV. 657 (1974); Note, Applying Constitutional Standards to Airport
Security Systems, 5 Loy. (CHI.) U. L. J. 186 (1974); Note, Airport Security
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1971).
2 See text at notes 16-19, infra.
2 The term "metal detector" is used to denote all electronic search equipment
which measures the mass of metal, ferrous or non-ferrous, on the person or object
passing through its field. No distinction is made between the earlier "magnetom-
eter," whch reacted to ferrous metals only, and the more sophisticated instruments
in use today, which react to ferrous and non-ferrous metal. See also Andrews,
supra note 1, at 659 n.5.
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), authorized a pat-down weapons frisk for
the protection of the officer and bystanders after an investigative stop. An ob-
jective test was applied to the police officer's suspicions, and the officer was re-
quired "to point to specific and articulate facts which, taken with rational infer-
ences from those facts, warrent[ed] the intrusion [of the frisk]." Id. at 21. The
protective search did not violate the fourth amendment when the officer reason-
ably believed the person frisked to be armed and dangerous to the officer and
others. In Terry a police officer had stopped the appellant after observing him
acting in a manner which justified a reasonable suspicion that he intended to rob
a store. When the appellant did not respond to a request for identification, the
officer frisked him and found a handgun.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
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an inappropriate justification, however, for the kind of indiscrimi-
nate searches currently in use, as will be seen." Therefore, this
comment will attempt to resolve some continuing constitutional
questions concerning the justifiability of current security procedures
and will discuss some of the associated problems of current pro-
cedures as recently amended.
HISTORY OF AIRPLANE HIJACKINGS AND SECURITY MEASURES"
The first recorded hijacking of an aircraft occurred in 1930,
when a group of Peruvian revolutionaries took over an airplane
for use in dispersing propaganda literature. During the period
1930-1931, there were several other attempted hijackings in South
America,9 but after these initial attempts no more hijackings oc-
curred until the end of World War II. In the post-war period,
hijackings became one method used by Eastern Europeans to
escape from Communist bloc countries."0
The first hijacking of a United States airplane took place in
1961, and resulted in the hijacker's successful transport to Cuba."
After five attempted or successful hijackings in 1961, there were
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The remedy available for a violation of the fourth amendment as formulated by
case law is exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search-
the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6See note 54, infra, and text at notes 129-30, infra. See also United States v.
Anderson, 13 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2395, 2396 (9th Cir. 1973) and People v.
Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 163-65, 524 P.2d 830, 832-34, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360-62
(1974), discussed at notes 160-66, infra, and accompanying text.
It is useful to present an abbreviated discussion of the development of air-
craft hijacking. It is not, however, the purpose of this comment to deal with it
in much detail. For more exhaustive treatment, see, e.g., McGinley & Downs,
supra note 1, and Andrews, supra note 1, at 747.
'See McGinley & Downs, supra note 1, at 294.
'See Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL.
L. REV. 1004, 1006 (1973). In his address Dr. Dailey also discussed other dan-
gers faced in the early days of commercial aviation. Security measures taken at
times included the frisking of all passengers and the removal of all "guns, knives,
and booze." Passengers objecting to this search were apparently persuaded by
the pilot's use of a 5-cell flashlight filled with shot. "To quiet unruly drunks, the
crew would put on their oxygen masks and go up until the drunks passed out."
Id. at 1007.
"McGinley & Downs, supra note I, at 294.
II ld.
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only four during the years 1962 through 1967.12 In 1968, however,
the number of hijackings jumped dramatically; in that year sixteen
such incidents occurred. This increase continued in 1969 with
forty-one attempted or successful hijackings. " In 1970 there were
twenty-two, and in 1971 and 1972 there were twenty-seven each
year.1
4
There was little concern in the non-Communist world over the
criminal aspects of hijacking so long as the traffic was inbound
from Communist controlled nations. After the first American hi-
jacking in 1961, however, Congress passed a statute making hi-
jacking itself illegal. 5 Prior to the passage of that statute, hijacking
had been illegal only to the extent that some other offense was
committed during the hijacking.' There was little further legisla-
tive or regulatory activity in this area until 1968.
As a result of the tremendous increase in hijacking attempts
during 1968, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estab-
lished a task force in October of that year to study the problem.'
The result of this effort was the "hijacker profile."" This profile
was developed through the statistical study of previous hijackers,
and consisted of twenty-five to thirty objective criteria of behavior"'
which distinguished the potential hijacker from the average air
traveler. Several studies indicated that the application of the profile
to air travelers would clear 99.5 percent of them, but would clear
no potential hijackers." A voluntary screening program was insti-
ll Andrews, supra note 1, at 747 app.
13 Id.
14 Id.
"Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 1, 75 Stat. 466, amending,
49 U.S.C. § 1356 (Supp. V 1975). This statute also prohibited the carrying of
weapons or explosives on board aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(1) (Supp. V 1975).
1 See McGinley & Downs, supra note 1, at 295 n.22.
17 McGinley & Downs, supra note 1, at 302.
Is Id. Also, see generally Dailey, supra note 9.
"These behavioral patterns necessarily have been kept confidential, since ap-
parently an acceptable behavior pattern could easily be fabricated by a hijacker
with knowledge of the profile. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); McGinley & Downs, supra note 1,
at 302. But see Comment, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, and
Alternatives, 40 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 383, 396 n.106 (1973).
"See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
Dailey, supra note 9, at 1009. But see Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matter
of Search-or Seizure, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1261, 1265 n.35 (1973).
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tuted under which airline employees, such as ticket agents, applied
the profile to passengers entering the airport. Those passengers
fitting the profile were designated "selectees" by the employees,
and this information was forwarded to airline personnel at the
boarding gate, usually by distinctive markings upon the selectee's
ticket or boarding pass. Upon the selectee's arrival at the boarding
gate, he was required to pass through a metal detector with his
carry-on baggage.' If the metal detector indicated the selectee was
carrying an amount of metal equal to the mass of a small hand-
gun, the airline employee on duty at the gate stopped him and
requested identification. If satisfactory identification was not pre-
sented, a United States Marshal was summoned, and identification
was requested again." If the selectee still refused or was unable
to present satisfactory identification, he was requested to pass
through the metal detector a second time. A second indication of
metal on the person or in the baggage of the selectee provoked a
request for submission to a voluntary "pat-down frisk."'. The
selectee's carry-on baggage was also searched." If at any point in
this procedure the selectee passed a particular test, further investi-
gation was foregone and he was allowed to board the airplane."
Initially the use of this screening procedure was voluntary; as a
" This apparently was not a separate requirement for selectees. All boarding
passengers passed through the metal detector where the security system was used,
but the detector's reaction was monitored only for selectees. Comment, Searching
for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CI. L. REV. 383,
400 (1973).
"1 From this point on, the security procedures were carried out by the United
States Marshal. Thus, except for the initial designation of the passenger as a se-
lectee, the United States Marshal conducted each step of the admittedly redun-
dant procedure at least once.
"See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
4 See United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
mem., 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
21It is obvious that the profile screening system had redundant elements in
the duplicated requests for identification and metal detector walk-through. It
might also be questioned what relevance satisfactory identification, or lack of
identification, would have to a person's intent on airplane hijacking. The task
force studies found that hijackers as a group were not resourceful or determined
persons, and that the imposition of a number of relatively minor obstacles in the
screening system would stop the hijacker at the gate. Further, it was believed
that the implementation of the system, along with publicity about it, would deter
potential hijackers from making an attempt. Deterrence was the primary objective
of the profile screening system. See, e.g., McGinley & Downs, supra note 1, at
304; Dailey, supra note 9, at 1008; U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1082-83.
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result, it was not used by all airlines. Moreover, the system was
not even used on all flights by those airlines which had adopted it.
However, in September, 1970, President Nixon directed the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) to "have American flag car-
riers extend the use of ... surveillance ... to all gateway airports
and other appropriate airports in the United States."' The DOT
continued to rely on voluntary cooperation by the airlines in carry-
ing out the President's directive until September, 1971,"7 when the
FAA concluded that such voluntary cooperation "ha[d] not satis-
factorily provided . . . needed protection in many instances."2
Consequently, the FAA proposed a new rule which would require
each air carrier to submit for FAA approval its security program
"showing the procedures, facilities, or screening system, or a combi-
nation thereof, that it uses or intends to use" for prevention or
deterrence of hijackings or in-flight bomb explosions."
On February 1, 1972, the FAA adopted a part of the previously
proposed rule, and required airlines to implement within seventy-
two hours a "screening system acceptable to the Administrator"
on all reservation flights.3' Although the requirements for the air-
"See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 899 n.17 (9th Cir. 1973), citing
1970 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon 742-43
(G.P.O. 1971).
2"See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 899 n.17, citing Hearings on Air-
craft Hijacking Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
101 (1970) (testimony of Under Secretary of Transportation James A. Beggs).
28 36 Fed. Reg. 19,173-74 (1971) (proposing a new rule to be codified in 14
C.F.R. 5 121.538).
29 Id. at 19,174. Concurrently the FAA proposed a new rule 14 C.F.R. 5 107
requiring operators of airports regularly serving scheduled air carriers to submit
their security programs for approval. 36 Fed. Reg. 19,172-73 (1971). It should
be noted that both proposed new rules provided that the Administrator could
amend any approved security program upon his own initiative. See proposed rule
14 C.F.R. § 107.5(a)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 19,173 (1971), and proposed rule 14
C.F.R. S 121.538(f), 36 Fed. Reg. 19,174 (1971).
2037 Fed. Reg. 2,500-01 (1972) (adopting a new rule to be codified in 14
C.F.R. S 121.538). This rule included only a part of the new rule 14 C.F.R.
121.538 proposed in September, 1971. See note 27, supra. It was found that
an emergency existed which required that the new rule be effective immediately
without waiting for the rulemaking proceeding to take its course. The FAA noted
that the profile procedure originally proposed for voluntary implementation had
been "highly effective," and expressed the opinion that most recent hijackings
"would have been prevented had the system been used to the fullest extent possi-
ble." See preamble to new rule 14 C.F.R. § 121.538, 37 Fed. Reg. 2,501 (1972).
This new rule was amended on March 6, 1972, giving the Administrator the
power to amend any approved screening system "upon his own initiative." 37
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lines' security systems were not spelled out in the new rule, the
FAA apparently informed the airlines by informal means that
application of the profile screening system to all passengers would
be acceptable, and that the system was in fact required. 1 Thus,
as of February 6, 1972, all passengers on all reservation flights in
the United States were subjected to the profile screening system.'
Although the implementation of surveillance was first instituted
with regard to certain airports in 1970 by Presidential directive,
metal detector screening and baggage searches without discrimi-
nation among passengers were first explicitly required for certain
flights in July, 1972, when President Nixon ordered the search of
all carry-on baggage and the monitored metal detector screening
of all passengers for all non-reservation shuttle flights. ' On Jan-
uary 5, 1973, this requirement was extended to include all pas-
senger flights.' As can be seen from the preceding discussion, after
Fed. Reg. 4,904-05 (1972), amending rule 14 C.F.R. § 121.538. This amendment
became effective April 6, 1972. A further amendment was issued on April 4,
effective April 11, 1972,"to supply language inadvertently omitted from the
[March 6] amendment." See 37 Fed. Reg. 7,150-51 (1972), amending 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.538. The effect of this second amendment was to include intrastate air
carriers within the requirements of the rule.
On March 16, 1972, the FAA issued a new rule 14 C.F.R. S 107, adopting
with minor changes the rule proposed for airport operators in September, 1971
(see note 28, supra). Again, the "emergency" situation required that the new
rule be effective immediately. See 37 Fed. Reg. 5,689-91 (1972).
"1 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 900-01 nn.20 & 22, citing FAA
Press Release No. 72-26 (Feb. 6, 1972).
32On August 1, 1972, the FAA exercised its power to amend the approved
security programs by eliminating the multiple requests for identification. Airlines
were forbidden to allow any person identified as a selectee to board without first
searching his baggage and clearing him through a metal detector. If no metal
detector was available, the selectee could not board without submitting to a "con-
sent" search. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 901 n.24, citing FAA tele-
gram of August 1, 1972, and DOT Press Release No. 72-72 (August 1, 1972).
" See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 901-02 n.23, citing FAA telegram of
July 18, 1972. Because tickets may be purchased for shuttle flights after boarding
and take-off, and because shuttle flights are used primarily for one-day business
trips for which there is no need to check baggage, such flights are not suited to
effective use of the profile for selection of persons to be screened.
84 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 901-02 n.25, citing DOT Press Re-
lease 103-72 (Dec. 5, 1972). Concurrent with this requirement the FAA issued
emergency regulations amending 14 C.F.R. § 107 to require that each airport
operator submit an amendment to its master security plan. The amendment to
each plan was to "set forth facilities and procedures" which would insure that
each operator would provide at least one armed law enforcement officer at each
screening checkpoint for each flight. See 37 Fed. Reg. 25,934-35 (1972), amend-
ing 14 C.F.R. § 107. The amended regulations were to go into effect immediately,
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security systems were first introduced on a voluntary basis in
1968, they were extended over time to cover more flights. Grad-
ually the procedures were made more rigorous until early 1973,
when the current system was adopted. Today, all passengers on all
flights in the United States are required to submit to metal detector
screening and baggage search before being allowed to board the
airplane.
CASE LAW ON THE PROFILE SCREENING SYSTEM AND
OTHER EARLY SECURITY SYSTEMS
The first federal court to address the antihijacking procedures
outlined above was the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York in United States v. Lopez.' In this case, as in
many which followed,"6 the defendant was arrested for possession
of illegal drugs discovered as the result of a frisk initiated as a
part of the screening system. In a memorandum opinion, Judge
Weinstein discussed at great length the profile screening system 7
and found the procedure justifiable under the holding of Terry v.
Ohio" when correctly applied. The court addressed the question
of the constitutionality of the frisk subsequent to other elements
but litigation delayed their effectiveness until February 16, 1973. See Airport
Operators Council Int'l v. Shaffer, 354 F. Supp. 79 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
With these requirements, the current procedures were substantially in effect.
One further amendment deserves mention, however. On April 15, 1976, an addi-
tional amendment to 14 C.F.R. S 121.538 became effective. This amendment re-
quired a "screening system, acceptable to the Administrator," for "explosive[s]
or incendiary device[s] in checked baggage." 41 Fed. Reg. 10,911 (1976). Thus
today all baggage, and not just carry-on baggage, is subject to screening.
In addition to the procedures outlined above, the President ordered the im-
plementation of the "sky marshal" program in the early 1970s. Under this pro-
gram, armed plainclothes federal marshals were passengers on selected flights
to stop attempted hijackings. This program was terminated when it proved to be
ineffective. See McGinley & Downs, supra note 1, at 298.
1328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"8See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d
884 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972); United States v. Scott, 406 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United
States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972); and People v. Hyde,
12 Cal. 3d 160, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
" See notes 19-25, supra, and accompanying text.
38 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a brief discussion of this case, see note 4, supra.
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of the procedure, and found that use of the profile, metal detector,
and identification requests could produce the "specific and articul-
able facts" necessary for a "Terry-type search.' In balancing the
governmental interest asserted against the citizen's fourth amend-
ment interests, the court noted that six percent of those frisked
were found to have weapons, and noted the acknowledged danger
hijackings pose. As a result of this balancing of interests, the frisk
was found to be reasonable and justified when the profile screen-
ing procedures were followed strictly and completely.' Judge
Weinstein refused to find consent to the search, despite the pres-
ence at boarding areas of signs alerting passengers to the fact they
and their baggage were subject to search. The government had
not proved that any consent defendant may have given had been
voluntary. Notwithstanding its approval of the profile screening
system, the court found the search in this particular instance to
be unreasonable because the FAA profile had been altered without
authorization by an airline official. The court found the airline
employees to be governmental agents in their designation of profile
selectees,"' and therefore the search which was the "fruit" of this
designation was held impermissible." Because of this ultimate hold-
39 Judge Weinstein concluded that the six percent probability of finding a wea-
pon during a frisk, as indicated by statistical studies, warranted the reasonable
suspicion which justifies a "Terry-type" search. 328 F. Supp. at 1097. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has expressed "grave doubt" as to the validity of this con-
clusion. People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 160, 164, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358
(1974).
,' 328 F. Supp. at 1084.
' Id. at 1101. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). In Mitchell Judge Dooling
found that an airport search did not invoke fourth amendment standards:
The context is not basically a citizen-to-government context, and
invocation of the Fourth Amendment appears as an almost gratui-
tous consequence of the presence in the background of govern-
mental air safety regulation and of the governmental provision at
the airports of peace officers to apprehend people found actually
committing or attempting crimes .... The persons interested in the
flight, carriers, crew, and passengers, are not seeking to detect crime
or to prevent crime in the public interest. Their interest, absolute
and unqualified, is in safe flight. Id. at 42-43.
The fourth amendment does not prohibit unreasonable searches by private
individuals. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Thus, if the airline em-
ployees using the profile screening system in Lopez had been held to be acting
in a private capacity, the alteration of the profile would not have been fatal to
the subsequent search.
' Without valid "specific and articulable facts," there could be no Terry
justification for the frisk. Since each step of the procedure depended upon all the
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ing in the case, most of the discussion approving the profile screen-
ing system was dictum. Nevertheless, Judge Weinstein's analysis of
the need for the proffile system and its effectiveness has been relied
upon in many cases. '
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a "Terry-type"
frisk and baggage search in a series of cases where defendants
were subject to the entire screening process." The court's decision
in United States v. Bell' indicated, however, that there was dis-
agreement on the circuit bench as to the true justification for the
search. Chief Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion stated
that "the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness" (emphasis
in original) in a good faith antihijacking search of reasonable
scope where the passenger had notice that he was subject to
search. ' He reasoned that the passenger could avoid the search
simply by choosing another means of travel. Judge Mansfield filed
a concurring opinion, however, specifically taking issue with Chief
Judge Friendly on this point, fearful that such a holding would
result in abuse of the screening process."
preceding steps to provide such facts and justification, when the initial justification
developed by governmental agents was lacking, all the subsequent steps were
unjustified and illegal under the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Under
that doctrine, any information or evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful
search not only may not be used in court, but also may not be used to obtain
other information or evidence in a lawful manner. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
'See, e.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972);
People v. Lee, 32 Cal. App. 3d 907, 108 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1973).
'4 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 498 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States
v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"-464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
"1 Id. at 675 (Friendly, C.J., concurring). Judge Friendly was unwilling to
assume that the fact that no flight where the profile had been properly applied
had been hijacked proved that the profile's use was preventing the hijackings.
Id. n.1.
' Id. at 675-76 (Mansfield, J., concurring). Judge Mansfield was not alone
in this feeling, nor was it wholly unjustified. As of November, 1972, less than
20% of arrests resulting from all airport searches, a majority of which presum-
ably stemmed from the profile screening system, were for weapons. More than
33% were for drug offenses. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 909 n.43, citing
N.Y. Times, November 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2. The remaining arrests were for
other violations, such as illegal immigration. Id. This raises a question whether
the profile was a predictor of hijackings, or merely an indicator of lawless ten-
dencies or activities. See also United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.), (Goldberg, J.,
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Absent a true "Terry-type" situation, and despite Chief Judge
Friendly's concurrence, however, the Second Circuit refused to
uphold any airport searches based upon this form of implied con-
sent in a situation where the entire screening program was not used
but could have been."8 Thus, the following rule developed in the
Second Circuit: in a situation where use of the profile screening
system was proper, only the implementation of the entire pro-
cedure in sequence could justify a frisk under the Terry doctrine."
The Third and Fourth Circuits did not require such strict ad-
herence to the elements of the screening procedure. In United States
v. Epperson,"° the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
use of a metal detector, apparently without profile screening, was
reasonable in light of the threat of hijacking. The court did not
even discuss the profile system in its opinion. In United States v.
Slocum,' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, citing Epper-
concurring), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). Judge Goldberg's Legato con-
currence is discussed in note 58, infra.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974). In Ruiz-Estrella the
court held that Judge Friendly's theory was inapplicable, assuming arguendo
that it was correct, because defendant had not been informed of his right to re-
fuse the search by not boarding the airplane. Warning signs could not be as-
sumed to have apprised him of this right. 481 F.2d at 728-29. In Albarado, the
court stated that the universal use of metal detectors without the use of the pro-
file was not unreasonable, but that any further searches subsequent to activation
of the metal detector must start with the least intrusive, for example, a request
for removal of metal objects along with a second walk through the metal de-
tector. The court stated the rule as follows: "the frisk in the typical boarding
situation ...is to be used only in the last instance." (emphasis in original). 495
F.2d at 808-09. The court found the use of a metal detector to be a search. Id.
at 803. It also found that conditioning air travel upon waiver of fourth amend-
ment rights was not based upon consent grounds, but upon reasonableness. Id.
at 805-07. See also notes 131-33, infra, and accompanying text.
49 See notes 40 & 48, supra, and accompanying text.
50454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
81 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972). In this case none of the intermediate steps
involving airline employees were used. It appears that under Albarado the Second
Circuit would have found the subsequent frisk unreasonable.
The Third Circuit had addressed an airport search in one earlier case, United
States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
This case did not, however, address the profile screening system. There was
testimony that "possibly the ticket agent used a so-called Behavior Pattern Pro-
file to determine whether defendant fit the mold of prior highjackers." However,
the court found no need to reach issues concerning profile usage "because the
justifiable bases for the search were largely independent of the Profile." Id. at
704. The court found exigent circumstances justifying the search in the "enor-
mous consequences" which might result from a hijacking and the limited time
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son, specifically held that the use of a metal detector was per se
reasonable and thus constitutional, independent of the profile.
While the profile was useful in focusing attention on potential hi-
jackers for metal detector monitoring, the court did not believe
its use was required by the fourth amendment." Thus, in both
these circuits indiscriminate and universal use of the metal detec-
tor, has been authorized from the outset and the changes in the
security program requirements mandated during 1972 and 1973
had no real effect.
The Fifth Circuit took a different tack in applying the Terry
doctrine to airport searches. In United States v. Moreno," the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals focused exclusively on the language
in Terry concerning danger to others to uphold the search of de-
fendant as reasonable." In its discussion the court stated that an
airport, like a border crossing, was a "critical zone" because of
the gravity of the hijacking problem, and therefore "mere sus-
picion" could justify a search." In two later appeals decided the
same day by different panels, the "critical zone" language of
Moreno was adopted and applied to justify not the manner or
scope of the searches, as had been the case in Moreno, but rather
the searches themselves." United States v. Legato"7 upheld a search
occurring after a bomb threat had been received. Although argu-
available for action by the United States Marshal. The court consequently low-
ered the suspicion necessary for a justifiable search from that required in Terry.
Id. at 703.
52 464 F.2d at 1183.
53475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
"At least one commentator has taken issue with this reading of Terry. All
courts justifying the airport search under Terry have based their deciison in part
on the "protection of others" language in Terry. However, a close reading of the
Terry opinion indicates that the others to be protected are bystanders at the scene
of the frisk, and not the ultimate intended victims of any suspected criminal plan.
The danger of violence to both the searching officer and the "others" arises from
the confrontation between the officer and the person searched. See Note, Applying
Constitutional Standards to Airport Security Searches, 5 Loy. CHI. L. J. 186,
200 (1974). See also People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 160, 163-65, 524 P.2d 830, 115
Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974). But see Moreno, 475 F.2d at 47-48 n.2.
5475 F.2d at 51. "Mere suspicion" is sufficient to justify a border search.
See Moreno, id. n.8. The Moreno court explicitly stated, however, that its decision
rested on Terry, and refused to adopt the border search analogy to justify the
search.
" United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
979 (1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
57480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
1978]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ably the search could have been upheld as reasonable under Terry
without the critical zone designation, the court found the search
justified on the basis of the border search analogy and defendant's
implied consent.' Again based upon this Moreno critical zone
approach the court in United States v. Skipwith59 held that even
"4mere or unsupported suspicion" justified a search of passengers
actually presenting themselves for boarding of an airplane.' The
court expressly declined to follow a district court decision in the
Ninth Circuit to the contrary," and held that once a passenger had
presented himself for boarding, he had no right to leave the
boarding gate in order to avoid the search. 2 It is interesting to
note that Skipwith was the first Fifth Circuit case to involve scru-
tiny of any element of the profile screening procedure, but although
defendant fit the profile, he was not subjected to a metal detector
scan, prior to being frisked.
8 Judge Goldberg concurred only in the result, elegantly expressing concern
over the fact that most airport searches had revealed drugs rather than weapons.
His concurrence, in its entirety, stated:
Under the commands of Moreno I concur only in the result. The
exigencies of skyjacking and bombing, however real and dire, should
not leave the airport and its environs an enclave where the Fourth
Amendment has taken its leave. It is passing strange that most of
these airport searches find narcotics and not bombs, which might
cause us to pause in our rush toward malleating the Fourth Amend-
ment in order to keep the bombs from exploding. Seeking to prevent
or deter crime, standing alone, has never justified eroding the right
to privacy, and I continue to hope that we will soon return to the
hallowed and halcyon days of the Fourth Amendment.
480 F.2d at 414. Both Moreno and Legato involved drugs found during airport
searches.
69482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 1276. It was fortunate for the government's case that the suspicion
could be unsupported rather than reasonable. The United States Marshal testified
that he was "inclined to believe" that a three-inch by two-inch bulge, approxi-
mately the size of a business card, was a gun. There are very few guns available
which are this small. Because of this claimed "belief," the Marshal ordered the
defendant to remove the "gun" (which proved to be drugs) from his pocket. Id.
at 1274.
61 United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See note
80, infra, and accompanying text.
62 482 F.2d at 1277. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow
a hijacker to try to board flights until he was successful. Id. at 1281 (Aldrich,
J., dissenting). The majority expressly adopted this part of Judge Aldrich's dis-
sent. Id. at 1277.
The court added much dictum questioning the continued utility of the exclu-
sionary rule but, having held the search valid, found no error in admitting the
drugs found in the weapons search. See id. at 1277-79. For a brief explanation
of the exclusionary rule, see note 5, supra.
COMMENTS
Fourth amendment rights at the airport continued to be diluted
in the Fifth Circuit with the court's decision two weeks later in
United States v. Miller.' In a per curiam opinion, the court held
with practically no discussion that preflight security searches need
not be limited to a search for weapons." A literal reading of the
decision seems to indicate that an airport security search may be
made for anything. However, since the basis for upholding the
search in Miller was consent, this decision is distinguishable from
the preceding fifth Circuit decisions, and it is possible that the
court oversimplified and perhaps misstated its holding.
In United States v. Cyzewski' the Fifth Circuit extended the
scope of the antihijacking search to include checked baggage
already on the airplane in those cases where the passenger fit the
profile, refused to produce identification, and stated that his identi-
fication was in his checked luggage. The defendants here were
not subjected to a metal detector until after they had produced
identification, which they had on their persons despite their claims
that it was in their luggage. As a result of the metal detector scans
it was clear that if defendants had any large metal objects, they
were in the checked baggage which had been retrieved from the
airplane." Nevertheless, the court held that the security search
could reasonably include the checked baggage that would not be
available to the passenger. The court stated that continued search
would be reasonable until the officer conducting it was satisfied
that no harm could come from the passenger's boarding the air-
plane, and until it became unreasonable to further doubt the pas-
senger's innocence." Cyzewski was limited, however, in United
States v. Palazzo,' which disapproved retrieval and search of de-
63480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1041 (1973).
"Id. at 1010. The court's exact language was: "Appellant's assertion that an
airport search must be limited to search for weapons is without merit." Id.
05484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 902
(1974).
Focusing on the deterrent effect of antihijacking programs, the court had
no problem with the fact that no search was made until after the luggage, which
supposedly contained identification and later was suspected of containing wea-
pons, was made accessible to the passenger. The court found the deterrent effect
of the officers' calling defendant's bluff justified a search for weapons which ob-
viously could not be used in a hijacking. Id. at 514.
" Id. at 513-14.
68488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
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fendant's checked baggage since the defendant had not fit the pro-
file, had produced satisfactory and correct identification, and had
no metal revealed by metal detector scan and frisk. In both
Cyzewski and Palazzo the passengers had presented themselves for
boarding.
In view of the Fifth Circuit cases discussed above, it appears
that the following rule developed for that circuit: any person
attempting to board an airplane is subject to a complete search
for anything accessible to him, and he cannot refuse to submit to
such a search. Further, so long as it is not completely unreason-
able for the security officer to doubt the passenger's innocence,
he may allow his whimsy free rein and extend the search to any-
thing which might be contained in the passenger's checked bag-
gage. Since this rule allowed very broad discretion for airline
security officers in the Fifth Circuit, implementation of the uni-
veral and indiscriminate search procedures in 1972 and 1973"
obviously had little real impact in the Fifth Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in United
States v. Fern,"0 cited with approval the Fifth Circuit Moreno"'
and Legato" decisions. It held that profile fit without a metal de-
tector search justified a stop and search, although the facts of
the case could have provided more justification for a frisk and
baggage search along the lines of Terry than this holding indicates
on its face." Nevertheless, so long as the profile screening system
was in use, it appears that profile fit alone would justify a personal
search in the Seventh Circuit.
United States v. Kroll" was the first case in which the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced the airport security system."'
"9 See notes 32-34, supra, and accompanying text.
70484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973).
71 See notes 53-56, supra, and accompanying text.
72 See note 57, supra, and accompanying text.
71 Defendant's actions aroused the United States Marshal's suspicions enough
that he checked with the agent who sold defendant his ticket. Further information
obtained from the ticket agent led the Marshal to conclude that defendant fit the
profile. Defendant's actions during the identification interview and subsequent
frisk fully justified a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a weapon in his
carry-on baggage. 484 F.2d at 667.
'4481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
" The profile had played a part in three previous decisions by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals involving airline search of checked baggage after the
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The court held that the mere posting of signs stating that passen-
gers were subject to search did not establish free and voluntary
consent to the search, since refusal to consent "would have meant
foregoing the constitutional right to travel.""8 Here the passenger
apparently had fit the profile," but had presented identification
upon request. Nevertheless, he was subjected to a metal detector
search."8 The metal detector indicated defendant was carrying
metal, his briefcase was searched, and drugs were found. The
court held that even under these circumstances the scope of the
search for weapons and explosives had to be reasonable, and
found that here the scope had gone beyond the bounds of reason."
The leading case in the Ninth Circuit on airport searches was
passenger at least partially fit the profile. However, in each case the facts were
such that the court found the search involved to be a private search conducted
by the airline for its own purposes, and not as a part of the antihijacking security
procedures. See United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973);
United States v. Burton, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835
(1973). Because they were conducted by airlines personnel in a private capacity,
the seaiches involved in these cases were not subject to the fourth amendment.
See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), and note 41, supra. In a similar
fact situation today, however, it seems unlikely that these decisions would
be followed. The 1976 amendment to 14 C.F.R. 5 121.538, requiring screening
of all checked baggage, has probably imbued such searches with sufficient regu-
latory character to require a different holding. See note 34, supra. See also United
States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977).
71481 F.2d at 886. The right to travel has been recognized since 1823. Cor-
field v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). The Supreme Court recog-
nized it as fundamental over 100 years ago. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1867). The Court has continued to uphold this right to the
present day. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
757 (1966).
" "The ticket seller, through some process which was not fully described, de-
termined that the defendant was a possible hijacker." 481 F.2d at 895. The ticket
agent requested the passenger's driver's license, which was produced. He then
marked the ticket to indicate the passenger met the profile. id.
" If the profile screening procedure had been followed strictly, producing ade-
quate identification would have cleared the passenger, and he would have been
subjected to no further screening. See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.
" The United States Marshal testified that he believed a very small bulge
("approximately f inch thick and 2 inches across") in one corner of a business
envelope in the briefcase might contain explosives. 481 F.2d at 885, 887. The
court found this belief unreasonable, and in fact questioned whether the Marshal
seriously held such a belief. There being no reasonable belief or suspicion that
the envelope contained explosives, its search was unreasonable. The court ex-
plicitly limited its holding, as to the reasonableness of a belief that such a small
bulge might be caused by concealed explosives, by the state of the art in minia-
turizing explosives. Id. at 887 n.4.
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the district court decision in United States v. Meulener." In Meule-
ner, which involved a motion to suppress illegal drugs found dur-
ing an airport search,8 the court held that the search of the pas-
senger's suitcase violated the fourth amendment since he was not
told before the search that he could refuse to be searched by not
boarding the airplane. Government interest in preventing hijackings
would not be present if the passenger decided not to board."' In
such a case the passenger's fourth amendment rights would be
coextensive with those of non-passengers present in the airport
who were not subject to forcible search.' Signs had been posted
in the boarding area to warn that passengers and their baggage
were subject to search. The court, however, found these signs were
insufficient to prove implied consent, and held that the govern-
ment could not condition the exercise of the constitutional right
to travel upon the waiver of fourth amendment rights.' In addition,
the screening procedure was not followed completely nor in
sequence, resulting in a search insufficiently limited in scope and
an independent basis for the court's holding.8
80351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
81 Of the cases discussed so far, only four involved the discovery of weapons.
See also note 36, supra, and accompanying text. Of 49 cases surveyed by one com-
mentator in 1974, only five involved weapons-related offenses. See Andrews,
supra note 1, at 726 n.382.
Two earlier cases in the Ninth Circuit had involved searches at airports which
resulted in the discovery of drugs. In United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972), an "administrative search" (see note 87,
infra) by a United States Department of Agriculture official in connection with
an agricultural quarantine of Hawaii was upheld, based on the Supreme Court
decision in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), discussed at notes
184-89, infra, and accompanying text. After finding a "compelling urgency," the
court held that a warrant was not required because time delays would " 'frustrate'
the purpose of these inspections" and "effectively cripple any meaningful quaran-
tine." 461 F.2d at 858. In United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal.
1972), the district court disapproved a search of previously checked baggage after
defendant fit the profile, failed to produce satisfactory identification, and produced
a "slightly positive reaction" on the metal detector. No contraband or weapons
were found when defendant was frisked. The court specifically held that profile
fit and inadequate identification did not justify a warrantless search. Airport
searches must be based on consent, and the passenger must be aware of his option
to avoid the search by not boarding the airplane. Id.
8 351 F. Supp. at 1289.
13Id. at 1290.
84Id. at 1288, quoting United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1092-93, dis-
cussed at notes 35-43, supra, and accompanying text.
"351 F. Supp. at 1291.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted parts of Meulener
in its decision about six months later in United States v. Davis."
The court held it reasonable for the government to condition fly-
ing upon a reasonable "administrative search"" of passengers,
provided they were given the option to avoid the search by choosing
not to fly." In United States v. Miner," the court clarified this
right to avoid an airport search in a situation in which the defend-
ant fit the profile but had not activated the metal detector. The
court held that although consent to a search would be implied
where the passenger knew of the requirement and still attempted
to board, his consent could be withdrawn." Once his consent was
withdrawn, the passenger could be refused boarding. He could
not, however, be forced or coerced into submission to further
search. Continued requests by airline employees to search carry-on
baggage were found to be coercive if the passenger did not know
he could avoid the search by leaving the boarding area."1
The Ninth Circuit made it very clear in United States v. Moore"
that it did not consider airports "critical zones" as characterized
by the Fifth Circuit.' After the defendant in Moore was unable
8482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). The court examined the history of hijacking
regulation in great detail. See notes 26-34, supra, and accompanying text.
81 The rationale of the administrative search is that with respect to certain
regulated activities, consent to the search is implied from the fact that the person
subject to the search has engaged in the activity. The search, if reasonable in
method and scope, is not prohibited by the fourth amendment despite the absence
of a warrant, so long as the person makes no objection to the search. See Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967), discussed at notes 184-89, infra.
88 482 F.2d at 913. Although the court did find that consent could be implied
from the passenger's knowledgeable choice to board, and thereby to subject him-
self to search, it is important to note that this does not mean that the passenger
must waive his fourth amendment rights in order to exercise his constitutional
right to travel. "The Constitution does not forbid searches and seizures; it forbids
only those that are unreasonable." United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771
(discussed at note 50, supra, and accompanying text), citing Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). By retaining the requirement of reasonableness,
the Ninth Circuit does not require waiver by the passenger. It therefore avoids
some of the constitutional difficulties which may arise in the Fifth Circuit under
its "critical zone" holdings, discussed at notes 53-68, supra, and accompanying
text.
88484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973).
90ld. at 1076.
91 Id.
82 483 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973).
"8 See text and notes 53-68, supra.
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to produce satisfactory identification, he was denied boarding.
His previously checked baggage was returned to him, and he then
attempted to leave the airport. He was subsequently stopped, how-
ever, and a search of his baggage revealed drugs. The court found
this was not an administrative search under the screening system,
and also that it was not a valid "Terry-type" search, since the bag-
gage was locked. Any weapons in locked luggage: would not be
readily available to the defendant during the stop."
As shown by the cases discussed above, three major justifications
for the airport search developed in relation to the profile screen-
ing system. In the Second" and Seventh"' Circuits, the search was
looked upon as a true "Terry-type" protective search, although the
persons to be protected were not the officials carrying out the
search, but rather the passengers on the specific flight. In the
Fifth Circuit the airport was viewed as a "critical zone." As a
result, at the boarding gate at least, any search was justified."'
Ninth Circuit decisions viewed the search as administrative, re-
quiring implied consent by the passenger for its justification.
Conditioning the passenger's right to board the airplane on such
a search was reasonable only if the passenger knew he could re-
fuse to be searched, or could stop the search at any time, by not
boarding the airplane."' The Eighth Circuit rule is less clear, but
with its emphasis on reasonableness" it seems to be -nearest the
administrative search rule of the Ninth Circuit. It is unclear at
this time whether the Third and Fourth Circuits 0 will ultimately
follow the direction taken by the Fifth Circuit, or that taken by
the Ninth Circuit. 1
483 F.2d at 1363.
See notes 35-48, supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 70-73, supra, and accompanying text.
"See notes 53-68, supra, and accompanying text.
"See notes 80-94, supra, and accompanying text.
"' See notes 74-79, supra, and accompanying text. With the passage of the Air
Transportation Security Act of 1974 (ATSA), § 315, authorizing the FAA to re-
quire passenger screening, it is submitted that the Ninth Circuit implied consent-
administrative search rationale has become more attractive and may be explicitly
adopted by the Eight Circuit in an appropriate case. For a discussion of the ATSA,
see notes 108-10, infra, and accompanying text.
'"See notes 50-52, supra, and accompanying text.
101 The decisions in those circuits are reconcilable with the reasoning of either
the Fifth Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. However, as stated with respect to the
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JUSTIFICATION FOR UNIVERSAL SEARCH
As has been stated, the current antihijacking system requires
that all passengers be searched before they are allowed to board.
This includes-in the ordinary situation-a walk through a metal
detector and either a hand search of carry-on baggage or an X-ray
examination of the baggage."2 The use of the profile on a regular
basis has been discontinued. 3 The change from the multi-step pro-
file screening system to a system of universal searches represented
a basic philosophical change in the purpose of the security pro-
cedures. The profile screening system was intended as a deterrent,
effective as much through publicity and its psychological impact
as through its ability actually to apprehend the hijacker in his
attempt.'" The current system is intended primarily to prevent
hijackings, not only by deterring the individual bent on such action,
but also by making access to an airplane impossible for anyone
with the tools of the hijacker's trade. Although the justification for
the change at the time was questionable,"2 the noticeable change in
Eighth Circuit (see note 99, supra), the passage of the ATSA should make the
Ninth Circuit position more attractive to the Third and Fourth Circuits. The im-
plied consent-administrative search rationale of the Ninth Circuit avoids the new
exception to the fourth amendment created by the Fifth Circuit, and it is no long-
er questionable on statutory grounds. See text and notes 108-10, infra.
102 By far the great majority of carry-on baggage searches are carried out by
the use of X-ray equipment. The hand search is still in use today, however, for
some flights at some airports. On April 1, 1978, carry-on baggage for a Texas
International flight to Houston, Texas, was searched by hand at Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport, one of the largest and most modern airports in the world.
103 See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 497 (2d Cir. 1974).
"I Dailey, supra note 9, at 1011. See also Comment, Searching for Hijackers:
Constitutionality, Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 383, 387 (1973).
105 The change in procedures was claimed to be necessary because an "emer-
gency" existed with respect to the threat of hijacking. The preamble to the De-
cember 6, 1972, amendment to 14 C.F.R. S 107 (see note 34, supra) is instruc-
tive. The FAA justified its new requirements by referring to the hijacking inci-
dents of October 29, 1972, and November 30, 1972. It should be noted that in the
first incident four armed men shot their way onto the airplane. See Comment,
Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 383, 391 n.71. It is submitted that in such a situation, when there are
several armed attackers who begin their assault before passing through the screen-
ing point, universal search and one armed guard's presence at the checkpoint
are not likely to present an insuperable obstacle to the hijackers. The procedures
required in December, 1972, simply would have been ineffective here. The No-
vember incident involved three men armed with guns and grenades, two wanted
for rape and one an escapee from jail. See id. and Andrews, supra note 1, at 762
app. It is at least open to question whether one armed guard could have stopped
them. In addition, it is not at all unreasonable to assume that a pitched battle
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the kind of hijacker threatening the traveling public today possibly
provides retrospective justification for today's more stringent and
more intrusive procedures.'
This practical justification, however, ignores the questionable
statutory basis for the FAA's authority to require passengers to
submit to the current security procedures at the time they were
adopted. Although the requirements were issued in the form of
regulations covering airports, airlines, and their security pro-
cedures, 7 in fact the intent and effect was' to regulate what pas-
sengers were allowed to carry on board airplanes. By delegating
the inspection activities to airline and airport personnel, a sembl-
ance of authority was maintained. Congress recognized the fic-
tional basis for the regulations with its passage of the Air Trans-
portation Security Act of 1974 (ATSA). Section 315 of that
act required the Administrator to "prescribe or continue in effect"
regulations "requiring ...all passengers [and carry-on baggage]
be screened by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities ... prior
to boarding."'' The Administrator was authorized to amend the
regulations "only to the extent necessary," and only by submitting
between police and hijackers at the boarding gate would have resulted in much
greater injury and loss of life.
The existence of an "emergency" at the time of the Orders of December,
1972, is also open to question. There were only three hijackings, including the
two described above, between August 1, 1972, when adequate identification no
longer allowed a selectee to board (see note 32, supra), and the issuance of the
regulations in December. This was the lowest number of hijackings for a com-
parable period since 1967. Comment, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality,
Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. at 391; Andrews, supra note 1, 747-63
app. This does not appear to be the situation of "escalating threats of hijacking,
extortion, sabotage and terrorism" described in the announcement of December
6. 37 Fed. Reg. 25,934 (1972). It is not unreasonable to assume that the reduced
incidence of hijackings was a direct result of the universal application of the pro-
file screening system, where appropriate, along with the August 1, 1972, elimina-
tion of the questionable procedure of clearing by identification.
100 Although hijacking has decreased as a problem in this country, largely be-
cause of the tightened security procedures, other countries have not seen such
a dramatic decrease. The problems of hijackings by political terrorists continue
to plague foreign countries, particularly in connection with the unrest in the
Middle East.
"' See notes 26-34, supra, and accompanying text. The question of the FAA's
authority was in fact raised in comments on the proposed new rule 14 C.F.R. §
107, proposed in September, 1971. See preamble to new rule 14 C.F.R. § 107 as
adopted, 37 Fed. Reg. 5,690 (1972).
10'Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 415 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356, 1357,
1371, 1372, 1472, 1516 (Supp. V 1975)).
10949 U.S.C. S 1356(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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the amendments to Congress thirty days prior to their effective
dates, absent an emergency."'
The profile system was designed as, and proved to be, a deterrent
because hijackers as a group were "neither very resourceful nor very
determined.' 1' This characteristic can hardly be used to describe
the typical revolutionary terrorist of today, who has been willing
in some instances to participate in obvious suicide missions, and
to continue on a destructive course long after his position has
become hopeless from all vantage points."' Since the elements of
the hijacker profile were understandably kept confidential," 3 it is
unknown whether they would apply to today's terrorist. However,
it might be a valid assumption that this new kind of hijacker,
apparently of a different psychological nature, would exhibit sig-
nificantly different behavior patterns from that of the "ordinary"
hijacker of 1968 and earlier years."" It is, therefore, questionable
whether the profile as originally developed could be used effectively
to identify the most dangerous of today's potential hijackers.
Although the profile could be updated"' to include elements which
would identify the terrorist prior to his attempt to board, it is
arguable that such identification would serve only to move the
11 Id. The requirement of submission of regulations to Congress, absent the
Administrator's determination that an emergency exists, would have had no effect
on any of the procedures required by the FAA prior to the passage of this Act.
In addition, the only substantive change in the regulations since December, 1972,
was also adopted without notice and public procedure because of the danger
posed. See 41 Fed. Reg. 10,911 (1976), amending 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 to require
screening of checked baggage, note 34, supra.
'1' Dailey, supra note 9, at 1008.
Examples of suicide missions are numerous in connection with the unrest
in the Middle East. A recent example is the raid in March, 1978, when Palestinian
commandos seized a bus and drove toward Tel Aviv, Israel. Most of the com-
mandos were killed or captured. See N.Y. Times, March 12, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
For other examples, see N.Y. Times, November 19, 1974, at 1, col. 4 (three Arab
guerillas killed at Beisan, Israel); N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 8 (Japa-
nese Red Army members attacked passengers at Lod Airport outside Tel Aviv;
two attackers killed and one captured). An example of terrorists continuing in
the face of a hopeless situation is the battle between the Symbionese Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Los Angeles Police Department, in which five members of
the SLA died. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
". See note 19, supra.
"' As has been stated, the profile was developed by the task force by studying
all known previous hijackers.
"' The original profile was intended to be, and possibly was, modified as new
hijacker types made their appearance. See Dailey, supra note 9, at 1010.
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terrorist activity from the inside of the airplane to the inside of
the airport concourse. Even this is not likely to be the endpoint of
the terrorist activity, as will be seen. A return to a profile screening
system, therefore, would be unlikely to provide adequate protec-
tion from the most immediate and greatest dangers posed by the
possibility of hijacking.
A hypothetical scenario is instructive. Having carefully planned
its raid, a team of terrorists arrives at an airport. Although desig-
nated by the ticket agent as selectees under an updated profile pro-
cedure,"' the group is permitted to proceed to the security check-
point. There they pull automatic weapons and grenades and take
hostages, including the security officers who are armed only with
pistols. These security officers are quite understandably unwilling
to confront the terrorists, who have superior arms. Such a con-
frontation would be suicidal, and would likely result in a massacre
of the persons in the immediate area. By moving quickly, the
terrorists are able to reach a selected boarding gate before an
alarm can be raised and they can be isolated. This boarding gate
would have been selected by the terrorists for its proximity to the
security checkpoint and its serving a flight with most passengers
already on board. If they are unable to reach the gate before the
area is sealed off, they simply take a large number of hostages and
barricade themselves in the most secure area of the airport avail-
able.' As has been illustrated, the existence of a profile has neither
deterred nor prevented this assault. Unfortunately, this fictional
scenario with its serious repercussions is even more possible under
the current system, since without the use of a profile there is not
the possibility of the ticket agent's warning the security check-
point personnel."'
" Whether this would occur in fact is highly questionable. It is easy to pur-
chase a ticket from a travel agent, who is unlikely to be privy to a confidential
profile, assuming that the profile would be usable when the ticket was purchased
at a time and place removed from the intended scene of the hijacking attempt.
In addition, it is possible through the use of credit cards to purchase airline
tickets by mail, and thus never to confront a ticket agent.
117 In early 1975, three Arab terrorists held 10 persons hostage in a washroom
at Orly Airport in Paris after an unsuccessful attempt to attack an Israeli airliner.
N.Y. Times, January 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
"I In fact a very similar incident has occurred already under current pro-
cedures. On February 23, 1974, a hijacker killed the security officer at a screening
checkpoint and boarded an airplane waiting for take-off. Andrews, supra note 1,
at 764 app. n.440.
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The possibility of a terrorist attack resulting only in the taking
of hostages and barricading within a portion of the building exists
for any building in which large numbers of people are present."'
The dangers of great injury or loss of life are as large in other
public buildings as in the airport terminal. Since this danger, un-
like the danger of airplane seizures, is not specific to air commerce,
there is no justification for singling out airports for more rigorous
security measures, based on this danger, than those instituted at
the more vulnerable public buildings dedicated to other purposes,
such as courthouses and other governmental buildings. '
There is less likelihood under current security systems as gen-
erally implemented, however, that a hijacker would be able to gain
access to an airplane. Under current procedures at larger and
busier airports, where all passengers, and more importantly all
carry-on baggage,' are screened or searched, security checkpoints
have been moved away from the boarding gate, and therefore from
the airplane."' By reducing the likelihood of a potential hijacker's
119 It may be argued that the airport is a more attractive target for a take-
over because of an asserted greater likelihood of escape by airplane. While this
may be true for the lone hijacker, it is not necessarily true for an organized band
of terrorists, the hijackers who present the greatest danger today. Such a group
would be quite capable of protecting themselves by limiting their exposure during
a transfer to an airplane, whether from a courthouse or a concourse. The de-
ciding factor with respect to their access to an airplane would be resolute refusal
by the authorities in negotiations to allow such access, whether by bus to the
airport or by walking down a concourse to the airplane. In addition, terrorist
groups tend to pick their targets for relevance to their cause as much as the po-
tential for escape. A final argument is that recent history in this country simply
does not support the greater attractiveness of the airport. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
March 10, 1977, at 1, col. 6 (Hanafi Moslems take over three buildings in Wash-
ington, D.C., holding almost 150 persons hostage).
120 For a discussion of courthouse security systems, see Jesmore, The Court-
house Search, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797 (1974).
12 A terrorist's automatic weapons are more easily concealed in baggage than
on his person.
'
12 It is unknown whether this has been done for security reasons or financial
ones, but it serves both. The primary security reason is obvious from the pro-
posed scenari--to increase the opportunity for isolating anyone trying to defeat
the system by assault. A further possible security reason is deterrence. Central
location of obvious screening checkpoints near ticket desks and airport entrances
conceivably would discourage the "ordinary" hijacker from any attempt simply
by the checkpoints' presence and obvious permanence. The boarding gate check-
point would not be apparent until the hijacker had at least begun his attempt.
The direct financial reasons are the lower capital investment and labor costs
required by a few central locations for the metal detector and X-ray units. An
indirect financial reason could be reduced passenger irritation in a less congested
screening situation, resulting in greater customer satisfaction and repeat business.
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access to an airplane, the purposes of the security system are served.
In contrast, the profile screening system as generally implemented
did not subject the passenger to any search until his arrival at
the loading gate.
As shown by the scenario and discussion above and in terms of
current risks associated with hijacking, there is a significant gov-
ernmental interest in a security system which is more effective as
a preventive, rather than merely deterrent, measure against hi-
jacking than the profile system previously used.' Arrayed against
this significant governmental interest is the passenger's constitu-
tional interest in privacy. Although on balance some type of uni-
versal and indiscriminate screening procedure is probably justified,
it is submitted that there are less intrusive methods currently avail-
able or possible, and that these less intrusive procedures should
be used in place of those procedures currently in use. Because of
the constitutional dimensions of indiscriminate and universal
screening, some of the case law generated by current universal
search procedures will be reviewed before examining proposals for
altering those procedures." '
CASE LAW ON NON-SELECTIVE SEARCH PROCEDURES
Initially, it is obvious that only one of the rules developed by
the various circuits in early holdings would be changed by sub-
jecting all passengers to search-the "Terry-type" justification
adopted by the Second and Seventh Circuits." Under the Fifth
Circuit holdings, any search was justified at the point where the
', No reason has been shown to expect this particular scenario. However, at
least some current thought suggests that terrorist hijackings may move to the
United States. See, e.g., Hadley, Terrorists Might Abandon Europe for Friendly
United States, Dallas Times Herald, January 1, 1978, § F, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Hadley
postulates that the absence of a response capability similar to that exhibited by
the Israeli military at Entebbe, Uganda, in July, 1976, (see N.Y. Times, July 4,
1976, at 1, col. 6) and by the West German military in November, 1977, at Mo-
gadishu, Somalia (see N.Y. Times, November 19, 1974, at 1, col. 4), makes
the United States particularly vulnerable to terrorist activities involving hijacking.
1"4 There is much less reported case law from the federal court system con-
sidering the reasonableness of security systems under the current procedures. It
is possible that this is a result of the changed procedures, substituting local law
enforcement for United States Marshals. See 14 C.F.R. § 170 (1977). However,
the federal case law which considers indiscriminate airport searches, along with
a number of state court decisions, is sufficient for some conclusions to be drawn.
2 See notes 35-48, 70-73, & 95-96, supra, and accompanying text.
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passenger attempted to board.' Under the administrative search
holdings in other circuits, a reasonable search was acceptable.
Of course, an indispensable part of reasonableness was notice to
the passenger that he would avoid the search by choosing not to
board the airplane."' Under the "Terry-type" protective frisk,
however, there must be "specific and articulable facts" raising a
reasonable suspicion that the person frisked is armed and danger-
ous to the security officer or others."' Even if the use of a metal
detector were viewed as a frisk, and not as a more complete
search,"' no circumstances would support suspicion of each indi-
vidual passenger attempting to board an airplane. In addition, the
manual or X-ray search of baggage could not possibly be viewed
as a "Terry-type" pat-down frisk, since the frisk was limited to
feeling the outer clothing for objects which might be weapons,
and did not permit the search of the contents of the clothing."'
Similarly, a thorough search of the contents of baggage, whether
by hand or by X-ray instruments, is more extensive than that
authorized under the holding of Terry. Thus, it would be impossible
to justify this search under a "Terry-type" rationale without facts
to raise the suspicion for every boarding passenger.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first addressed
the question of universal searches--eliminating the profile-in
United States v. Albarado.'" Since the flight involved here was an
international one, the profile system was not in use, and all pas-
sengers were routinely subjected to the metal detector. Defendant
activated the metal detector, and counterfeit money was discovered
as a result of the subsequent frisk. Although the court ultimately
held that the evidence should be suppressed," it stated in dictum
"2 See notes 53-68 & 97, supra, and accompanying text.
"' See notes 80-93 & 98, supra, and accompanying text. See also note 99,
supra, and accompanying text.
"' See note 4, supra.
12' Metal detector use has generally been held to be a search, rather than a
frisk. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 769, supra note 50; United
States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at text and notes
131-33, infra.
"'See United States v. Thompson, 405 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
181495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974).
"12 The court held that frisking the defendant without requesting him to remove
all metal objects and walk through the metal detector again was unreasonable.
It stated the rule as this: "the frisk in the typical boarding situation . . . is to be
used only in the last instance." (emphasis in original). Id. at 808-09.
1978]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that the use of a metal detector on all passengers constituted a rea-
sonable search in the airport context, and therefore was consti-
tutional.'"
In United States v. Edwards," the Second Circuit was faced
squarely with the question of indiscriminate, universal search of
carry-on baggage without the use of the profile. Although the
facts of the case might have justified the baggage search under the
Terry rationale applied in other cases,1" the court held that in-
discriminate manual searches of carry-on baggage were reason-
able.' Relying on the Edwards holding, the court in United States
v. Williams"' found "there was implied consent to search the
carry-on luggage by virtue of the fact that baggage which one does
not want to have searched may be consigned to the baggage com-
partment.
138
As indicated by the quoted language from Williams, the court
based its conclusions as to the permissibility of non-selective air-
port searches in Albarado, Edwards, and Williams on a finding
of implied consent in conjunction with the pertinent regulations
in effect.' Thus, the Second Circuit has adopted a position similar
to the administrative search rule formulated by the Ninth Cir-
"I Id. at 806.
184 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Defendant activated the metal detector when she walked through it carrying
her baggage. However, there is no indication she was required to walk through
again without the baggage, which would probably have been required under
Albarado. "[T]he case [also] present[ed] no ... questions concerning a search
of her person." Id. at 500. Therefore, the decision must rest squarely on the con-
stitutionality of the regulations in effect at the time requiring search of all carry-on
luggage. See id. at 499.
Id. at 500. The opinion was written by Chief Judge Friendly, who paral-
leled his concurrence in United States v. Bell, discussed at text and notes 45-47,
supra.
137 516 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975).
'
18 lid. at 12.
19 This appears to be the trend now in the Second Circuit, as recognized in
Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501, and Williams, 516 F.2d at 12. However, the Albarado
court expressly rejected implied consent as a justification for the airport search,
stating that forcing the passenger to choose between his constitutional right to
travel and the constitutional privilege to be free from unreasonable searches was
coercive. Because of this coercion, any consent would be invalid because not given
freely and voluntarily. Because Albarado cannot be reconciled with Edwards and
Williams on this issue, the rule in the Second Circuit regarding implied consent
is not so clear as it seems from Williams. See also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501
n.1 (Oakes, J., concurring).
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cuit." It is still unclear, however, whether the Second Circuit will
follow the Ninth Circuit by holding that a passenger may stop
the search at any point by deciding not to board.
Although there have been no Third Circuit decisions examining
the constitutionality of airport searches since the current require-
ments went into effect,' two decisions in that circuit do have rele-
vance to the question of the reasonableness of current procedures.
In United States v. Wilkinson," a Third Circuit district court held
that the defendant had "attempt[ed] to board an aircraft," for the
purposes of the statute prohibiting such an attempt while carrying
a concealed weapon.' Defendant had purchased a ticket and had
proceeded from the ticket counter with her carry-on luggage to-
ward the departure gate, passing through a security checkpoint
located a distance from the departure gate. X-ray examination of
her carry-on luggage revealed a gun. Although the decision does
not address the search question, it implicitly approves the reloca-
tion of the security checkpoint away from the boarding gate."
Such a decision arguably is more consistent with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's administrative search rationale than the Fifth Circuit "critical
zone" rule, which addressed itself specifically to the boarding gate.
,4o See Edwards, 498 F.2d at 498 n.5. This appears to be the trend despite
language in Albarado declining to find airport searches to fit "within any of the
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement" and specifically rejecting the
administrative search rationale. 495 F.2d at 803-04 & n.9.
A subsequent Second Circuit case, United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976), used the strongest possible
language regarding airport luggage searches. The Bronstein court stated in dictum
that "[tihere can be no reasonable expectation of privacy when one transports
baggage by plane, particularly today when the menace to public safety by the
skyjacker and the passage of dangerous or hazardous freight compels continuing
scrutiny of passengers and their impediments." Id. at 462 (emphasis added). In
Bronstein, dogs had been used to sniff checked baggage suspected of containing
marijuana. The quoted statement was pure dictum, however, since the use of dogs
was held not to be a search for fourth amendment purposes, and a subsequent
search was consented to by the defendants. It is hoped that this dictum will not
become the basis for any future decisions, since it is broad enough to cover any
luggage, and would permit search of unlimited scope of any baggage for any rea-
son, or for no reason at all.
1'4 As has been stated, decisions under the profile security system were suffi-
ciently broad to permit universal and indiscriminate search. See note 51, supra,
and accompanying text.
" 389 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd mem., 521 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1975).
14349 U.S.C. S 1472(1) (1970). See note 15, supra.
14See also State v. David, 130 Ga. App. 872, 204 S.E.2d 773 (1974), dis-
cussed and notes 173-74, infra, and accompanying text.
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In another district court decision, United States v. Bily,4 5 it was
held that consent to search could be withdrawn during the search,
and that the search could not continue after defendant indicated
that he had revoked his consent. The Wilkinson decision may indi-
cate that the Third Circuit will eventually adopt the administrative
search rationale, and if so, the Bily decision seems to indicate
that this adoption will include the entire rule, including the pas-
senger's right to withdraw his implied consent at any point in the
screening procedure.
No reported decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
or Eighth Circuits have been found which address the reason-
ableness of passenger or carry-on luggage screening under current
procedures.'"5 The Ninth Circuit has continued to view airport
searches as administrative under the procedures requiring universal
and indiscriminate screening of passengers, as evidenced by its hold-
ing in United States v. Canada." The Canada court upheld the
search procedure applied to defendant's carry-on luggage. based
on implied consent, stating that "the alternatives presented to a po-
tential passenger approaching the screening area are so self-evident
that his election to attempt to board necessarily manifests acquie-
scence in the initiation of the screening process."'" Defendant's
implied consent covered the manual search of his baggage after
the X-ray examination, since he had not withdrawn his consent. 0
145 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Bily was not an airport search case,
but rather involved the search of defendant's residence.
4 Two Sixth Circuit decisions, United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th
Cir. 1974), and United States v. Scott, 496 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
which resulted from airport security searches did not involve challenges of uni-
versal metal detector and baggage searches. The search in each was upheld be-
cause information developed in the early stages of the screening procedures justi-
fied the continued investigation which revealed weapons in Dalpiaz and drugs in
Scott.
147 527 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
141 The X-ray examination showed a large "indeterminate dark area." An air-
lines security guard told defendant that the bag would have to be opened and ex-
plained the reason. The security guard opened the bag when she received no ob-
jection, and found a large amount of cash-evidence suggested a total of $68,000.
Information developed subsequently resulted in defendant's arrest for possession
of narcotics. Since the subsequent developments were the "fruits" of these initial
X-ray and manual searches, it was necessary for the procedure to be approved
if defendant's conviction was to be upheld. See note 42, supra.
149 527 F.2d at 1378, quoting from United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 914.
150 See note 148, supra.
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United States v. Homburg' rejected the government's contention
that consent to search was irrevocable once a passenger had entered
the boarding area. The Homburg court stated that further search
could not be justified by implied consent when defendant had
expressed a desire to leave the boarding area rather than have his
baggage manually searched.""a In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
again rejected the Fifth Circuit's "critical zone" rationale."3
The courts of California have addressed the antihijacking screen-
ing procedures in a number of cases.' Those dealing with the pro-
file screening system generally did not rely on profile fit to justify
metal detector searches,'" but for the most part approved baggage
searches or frisks on the basis of express or implied consent."
The California courts first explicitly adopted the administrative
search rule in People v. Kluga."' In Kluga defendant challenged
151 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2654 (1977).
112 Manual search of the luggage was upheld, however, under the Terry doc-
trine because of a telephoned bomb threat and defendant's highly suspicious
actions.
I" See text and notes 53-68 & 97, supra. See also United States v. Miner, 484
F.2d 1075, discussed at note 89, supra, and accompanying text.
" The first reported California case, People v. Botos, 27 Cal. App. 3d 774,
104 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1972), held profile fit and failure to produce satisfactory
identification justified a request to search checked baggage. The court stated that
the United States Marshal "could continue [his investigation] until his suspicions
were, or should have been, allayed." 104 Cal. Rptr. at 195. Defendant had con-
sented to the search upon request.
"See, e.g., People v. Lee, 32 Cal. App. 3d 907, 108 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1973)
(metal detector search "justified at its inception"); People v. Lacey, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 170, 105 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1973) (no discussion of profile); People v. De-
Strulle, 28 Cal. App. 3d 478, 104 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1972) (no discussion of pro-
file). Lee specifically held that "a person who meets the profile or a person who
gives a positive reading to the [metal detector]" may be stopped and requested to
submit to personal and baggage searches. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (emphasis added).
'"See, e.g., People v. Lacey, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (consent to frisk after de-
fendant activated metal detector); People v. DeStrulle, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 640
(consent to baggage search after it activated the metal detector). In Lacey, al-
though the court relied upon United States v. Epperson (discussed at note 49,
supra) to find the search reasonable, the facts set out in the court's discussion
emphasize the notice given passengers that they and their baggage were subject
to search. Therefore, Lacey is consistent with the implied consent-administrative
search rule of the Ninth Circuit. This consistency is further supported by the fact
that defendant was free to leave at any time until the frisk revealed what was
reasonably thought to be a weapon, justifying the object's examination under
Terry. 105 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
... 32 Cal. App. 3d 409, 108 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1973). Again there was no refer-
ence to defendant's fitting the profile. Since the flight was international, it is likely
that universal and indiscriminate metal detector searches were in use. See text
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the examination of a cigarette package and a bottle found in his
boots when he was frisked after his activation of the metal detector.
The court held that "[t]he genesis and basis for the extent of de-
fendant's search .. .lay in an administrative regulation,.158 and
upheld the search.9
This administrative search rationale was subsequently adopted
by the California Supreme Court in People v. Hyde.' The court
found that any "undesirable consequences" which might flow from
eliminating warrant requirements for airport would be mitigated
by two main factors. First, the decision to search was not subject
to the discretion of security officers, since all passengers were sub-
ject to screening. Second, the screening procedures had to be as
limited in their intrusiveness as would be consistent with their pur-
pose of deterring or preventing hijacking and the carrying of
weapons or explosives on board airplanes. A further mitigating
factor was the individual's ability to avoid the search altogether
by electing not to board. " ' The California court's administrative
search rationale differed somewhat from that of the Ninth Circuit,
however, in that there was no reliance upon consent, express or
implied.' The Hyde court had no reason to deal with consent, for
the trial court had specifically found that the defendant had not
consented to search."3 In a footnote the supreme court stated that
the consent theory was inappropriate in any event, since com-
following note 131, supra. Defendant challenged the search which followed metal
detector activation, however, and not the metal detector use itself. The universal-
ity of metal detector monitoring in Kluga is not known.
1"8 32 Cal. App. 3d at 414, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 163. The regulations relied upon
were those adopted in February and March, 1972. See notes 30-32, supra, and
accompanying text.
'5 The court approved the search in light of modern technology's ability to
miniaturize explosives. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 416 & n.7, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 165 & n.7.
160 12 Cal. 3d 160, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974). Hyde involved
search of the defendant's carry-on baggage after he fit the profile. However, the
court held that neither profile fit nor metal detector activation was required for
further search in the airport screening context. This holding was not dictum,
since defendant had challenged the trial court's severely limiting his ability to
cross-examine on the profile. The court in a footnote found this limitation at trial
irrelevant under its holding that profile fit was unnecessary. Id. at 168 n.5, 524
P.2d at 836 n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.5.
161 Id. at 169, 524 P.2d at 837, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
' ' Thus, the California Supreme Court did not precisely follow the path sug-
gested in Lacey, discussed in note 156, supra.
10 12 Cal. 3d at 162, 524 P.2d at 832, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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pelling a passenger to choose between fourth amendment rights
and his constitutional right to travel constituted coercion; for con-
sent to be valid it had to be free and voluntary.'" The court re-
jected any justification of airport searches under Terry, since all
passengers were subjected to metal detector screening.'" A further
objection to the Terry rational was the fact that the persons other
than the frisking officer to be protected from danger in Terry
were bystanders to the frisk, and not intended victims of any
planned crimes.'
The Hyde court's holding with regard to consent has resulted
in the development of an administrative search rule in the Cali-
fornia courts somewhat different from that of the Ninth Circuit.
Lower court decisions following Hyde have held that once a pas-
senger had subjected himself to the initial stages of screening, he
could not stop further search by electing not to board. In Morad
v. Superior Court' defendant had activated the metal detector
three times, but did not consent to the frisk which followed."8
The California Court of Appeals interpreted the California Su-
preme Court's language in Hyde to mean that the election not to
board must be made prior to passing through any of the screening
procedures."9 The Morad court accepted the reasoning of some
I d. n.2, 524 P.2d at 832 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 360 n.2.
'Id. at 164, 524 P.2d at 833, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The court also expressed
"grave doubt" whether reasonable suspicion was justified by the six percent proba-
bility that a person frisked would be armed. Id. This statement was in response
to Judge Weinstein's finding in Lopez that this probability did justify a reasonable
suspicion that the selectee was armed and dangerous. See discussion of Lopez,
notes 35-43, supra, and accompanying text.
16 12 Cal. 3d at 164-65, 524 P.2d at 834, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
1844 Cal. App. 3d 436, 118 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1975); Cf. People v. Bleile, 44
Cal. App. 3d 280, 118 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). This part of the California rule is
diametrically opposed to that of the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Homburg,
546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2654 (1977), dis-
cussed at notes 151-53, supra, and accompanying text; United States v. Miner,
484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973), discussed at note 89, supra, and accompanying
text.
18 Defendant in Morad had also fit the profile, but the California Supreme
Court had held in Hyde that profile fit and metal detector activation could not
justify further search by themselves. See note 160, supra.
10944 Cal. App. 3d at 440-41, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23. The court found the
Hyde opinion's use of the word "attempting" in its discussion of the purpose of
the screening procedure to be crucial. Hyde had stated that purpose to be
"insur[ing] that dangerous weapons will not be carried onto an airplane and . . .
deter[ring] potential hijackers from attempting to board." People v. Hyde, 12
Cal. 3d at 166, 524 P.2d at 834, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (emphasis added).
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earlier federal court decisions that to hold otherwise would allow
a potential hijacker to try to board different flights until he found
one where he could successfully pass through the security screen."
As evidenced by these cases, under the California rule the airport
search is valid as an administrative search, but the rule differs in
some respects from that of the Ninth Circuit.
Other state courts have also considered airport security systems.
In State v. White"' the Arizona Court of Appeals approved the
universal screening procedures under the implied consent-adminis-
trative search rationale. The court held that a passenger must
have the right to avoid the search by electing not to board, and
that the search must be as limited as would be consistent with
its purpose. 17 ' A Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the metal de-
tector search of a non-passenger who passed through the security
checkpoint in State v. David.' The David court upheld the uni-
versal search of all persons entering the concourse as reasonable.'"
"7044 Cal. App. 3d at 441 & n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 523 & n.2. The Morad
court explicitly accepted the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1277, on this point. See note 62, supra.
See also discussion of Chief Judge Friendly's concurrence in United States v. Bell,
at note 46, supra, and accompanying text. It is submitted that this reasoning was
invalid for the search in Morad. At the time of the Morad search, the FAA regu-
lations requiring profile screening or universal search for all flights were in effect.
See notes 30-33, supra, and accompanying text. Thus, defendant could not have
been successful in his search for a flight without security procedures. There can
be little question of the invalidity of this reasoning for today's procedures, since
all passengers on all flights are now subjected to metal detector and baggage
searches. See note 34, supra, and accompanying text.
"' 110 Ariz. App. 505, 549 P.2d 600 (1976). White involved manual search
of defendant's carry-on baggage after X-ray examination showed an "indetermi-
nate shape" within the bag. Although the court found it "logical to conclude"
that defendant withdrew his implied consent when he declined to open the pack-
age within the baggage, it held that the information available to the security offi-
cer at the time constituted probable cause to search for illegal drugs.
1' 549 P.2d at 606. The court relied in part on the earlier decision of the
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 110 Ariz. 491, 520 P.2d 1115 (1974).
Miller had disapproved the search of carry-on baggage which was placed in a
locker after defendant was refused boarding. Defendant refused to consent to
search of the bag, and his boarding pass was pulled. Defendant then placed the
bag in a locker and was taken to an office within the airport. Three hours later,
and still without consent, the locker was opened and the bag was searched because
of claimed suspicion of a bomb. The court questioned whether there was in fact
such suspicion about a bag which had been left in the locker for three hours.
The search of the bag revealed drugs. Defendant had fit the profile, but there is
no indication in the opinion that he activated the metal detector.
" 130 Ga. App. 872, 204 S.E.2d 773 (1974).
174 204 S.E.2d at 775. The court relied on United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d
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An Oregon Court of Appeals, in State v. Chipley,7" held that the
scope of the airport search must be strictly limited to seeking
discovery of weapons or explosives. The court disapproved the
search in question as too broad in scope, and thus had no occasion
to rule on the permissibility of, or justification for, airport searches
in general.7 '
In a decision involving a search not in fact conducted under
the airport screening procedures, a Missouri Court of Appeals
adopted language from many of the earlier decisions on screening
systems. State v. Johnson... involved a search of carry-on luggage
after a bomb threat against the airline had been received. Defend-
ant subsequently aroused the suspicions of airline personnel by his
actions while purchasing his ticket In a wide-ranging opinion, the
court appeared to rely on the Fifth Circuit's "critical zone" lan-
guage, the Terry rationale, and express, consent to uphold the
search. Although the case did not involve routine screening, it
could be predictive of Missouri court reasoning in future airport
search cases.
There appears to be a trend in the cases discussed toward the
administrative search rationale, although the trend may not always
be clear. Even some courts which had previously rejected this
rationale appear to have adopted it now." ' Passage of the ATSA
makes this rationale for airport searches more attractive because
769 (discussed at note 50, supra), and United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180
(discussed at note 51, supra), without further discussion of the theories adopted
by various courts.
1529 Or. App. 691, 564 P.2d 1096 (1977).
176 The court stated that "the only consensus which has emerged from [the]
cases" considering airport security searches is that their scope must be limited.
564 P.2d at 1097.
177 529 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1975).
"' See notes 139-40, supra, and accompanying text. Only the Fifth Circuit has
taken a position totally inconsistent with the administrative search rationale, and
that circuit has not addressed the new screening procedures. The procedures which
became effective in January, 1973 (see note 34, supra), when taken in conjunction
with the ATSA, S 201 (49 U.S.C. § 1356 (Supp. V 1975), see text and notes
108-10, supra), may make the administrative search rationale more attractive to
the Fifth Circuit today. Its "critical zone" rationale could be abandoned simply by
finding that the hijacking "emergency" of 1973 is past. However, it is not thought
that such an abrupt change in Fifth Circuit reasoning is likely without Supreme
Court examination of airport security searches.
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of its authorization for the FAA to require this kind of regulation
of passengers rather than airlines. '
A PROPOSAL
There can be little doubt that the present system of airport se-
curity screening to prevent hijackings is effective against all but the
most determined of hijackers. There can also be little doubt that
the most determined hijackers would be able to defeat the system!"°
In addition, the innovative hijacker who is able to disguise his
weapon sufficiently (or bluff others into thinking something in-
nocuous is a weapon) will not be stopped by the metal detector
and X-ray searches carried out today."' Finally, there would be
little point in questioning the constitutionality of subjecting all
passengers to metal detector and baggage search, given the fact
that holdings in all jurisdictions would support the procedure.""
Acceptance of the necessity and reasonableness of some form
of indiscriminate search of passengers and baggage does not neces-
sarily mean that the particular procedures adopted in 1972 should
be continued through today and into the indefinite future. While
the procedures may have been reasonable in the context of the dan-
ger of hijacking in 1972' and of technology existing at the time,
changes in the threat and improvements in weapons detecting
technology change the context of the search. Each individual search
must be reasonable in its particular context. This can be seen from
the reasonableness test applied to administrative searches.
179 49 U.S.C. S 1356 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 108-10, supra, and accom-
panying text.
180 See notes 116-18, supra, and accompanying text.
' The first successful United States hijacking after the 1973 procedures went
into effect involved just such a bluff. On September 10, 1976, a group of Croatian
nationalists hijacked a Trans World Airlines flight en route from New York to
Chicago. The explosives they claimed to have turned out to be putty. See N.Y.
Times, September 11, 1976, at 1, col. 5; September 13, 1976, at 18, col. 1. More
recently, a hijacker kept a number of passengers hostage for several hours at
Atlanta, Georgia, in an unsuccessful hijacking attempt. His weapons were a toy
pistol and a transistor radio which he claimed was a bomb. See N.Y. Times,
December 26, 1977, at 16, col. 1. In both instances the hijackers had passed
through routine screening procedures.
.
8 The Seventh Circuit is a possible exception, since its justification under
the profile was based on Terry and it ha snot addressed the current procedures.
See notes 70, 96, & 125, supra, and accompanying text.
"' But see note 105, supra.
COMMENTS
The current law concerning warrantless administrative searches
derives from Camara v. Municipal Court" and See v. City of
Seattle.' Both cases involved area inspections to determine com-
pliance with local fire and housing codes,... The area inspection
programs were upheld as reasonable under a test, announced in
Camara, which involved "balancing the need to search against
the invasion the search entails.' '. 7 Public interest demanded that
the purpose of the search be achieved, and it was "doubtful that
any other technique would achieve acceptable results.'' . Another
factor the Court found persuasive was the fact that the inspections
involved were "neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery
of evidence of crime, . . . [and thus] involve[d] a relatively limited
invasion of the citizen's privacy.''. Because of these considerations,
a program of area inspections, not carried out by force, for en-
forcement of the codes was reasonable, and searches under the
program were also reasonable when the person whose building was
searched acquiesced in the search.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States'" relied on Camara
and See and held that forcible entry without a warrant was not
authorized under statutes regulating the liquor industry and author-
izing inspections.' However, the Court stated that "Congress has
broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor
laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand.'. Because
of the history of regulation, licensing, and inspection, this Con -
gressional power included "broad authority to fashion standards
'387 U.S. 523 (1967).
'"387 U.S. 541 (1967).
'" In both Camara and See the Court held that warrants were required be-
cause access to the areas to be searched was refused. Camara, 387 U.S. at 540;
See, 387 U.S. at 545. However, the holdings themselves are limited to the propo-
sition that the inspections could not be performed by force without a warrant.
Where entry is refused, the existence of an area inspection program for the geo-
graphic area in which the particular building is located, together with satisfaction
of the program's "reasonable legislative or administrative standards," would pro-
vide probable cause for issuance of a warrant covering the particular building.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
187 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
88 Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
189 Id.
10397 U.S. 72 (1970).
"'See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146, 7342, 7606 (1970).
19 397 U.S. at 76.
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of reasonableness for searches and seizures."1 3 The forcible war-
rantless search in Colonnade was disapproved because Congress
had "selected a standard that does not include forcible entries
without a warrant."' Rather, Congress chose to make a licensee's
refusal to allow an inspection a violation of the law punishable
by a fine.9
The Supreme Court again addressed the question of administra-
tive searches in United States v. Biswell."' Biswell, a licensed
dealer under the Gun Control Act of 1968," ' acquiesced in the
warrantless search of his locked storeroom after being shown that
the search was authorized by the Gun Control Act.9 The Court
found the statutory authority to be analagous to authority under
a search warrant, and upheld the search as reasonable.' Con-
siderations which the Court relied on included the fact that
"[large interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part of
the regulatory scheme."'' Upholding the warrantless search as
reasonable was necessary "if the law is to be properly enforced
and inspection made effective."'.. The Court found that the inspec-
tion was intended to serve a deterrent effect, which required "un-
announced, even frequent inspections."'' Requiring a warrant
would likely frustrate this purpose. "[O]nly limited threats to . . .
justifiable expectations of privacy" were posed because "[w]hen a
dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and
to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to
effective inspection.""' The Court held that "where . . . regulatory
inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibility of
abuse and threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the
1"3 Id. at 77.
104 Id.
"1 Id.
"'406 U.S. 311 (1972).
197 18 U.S.C. §5 921 et seq. (1976).
"'See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
'19406 U.S. at 315.
200Id.




inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically
authorized by a statute."'
As these Supreme Court cases show, for a warrantless adminis-
trative search to be reasonable, there must be an important govern-
mental interest outweighing the citizen's privacy interest. The
search must be authorized by statute, and it must be unlikely that
the purpose of the search can be achieved in a less intrusive man-
ner. Privacy expectations are reduced by the fact that the citizen
engaged in the regulated activity with knowledge that this sub-
jected him to search.
For a question of reasonableness to arise, the person subject to
the search must have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" with
respect to the area to be searched."° Although in subjective terms
it may not be reasonable to expect privacy with respect to one's
person or luggage in an airport today,' in the constitutional sense
such an expectation may in fact be reasonable. The fact that the
government has required metal detector and baggage searches
for the past five years cannot by itself justify such searches as
reasonable. 7
Given that an administrative search of some type is justified,
to survive constitutional scrutiny it must involve as little intrusion
as possible."' Those cases upholding the reasonableness of metal
2
0
4 Id. at 317.
20 See Katz v. United States, 387 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
2m It cannot be doubted that anyone who has traveled by air since 1973 knows
at least the initial stages of the search procedures-the walk through the metal
detector and the baggage X-ray. In addition, notice of the procedures is afforded
both by signs posted in the airport and by the visibility of the metal detector
and X-ray devices. Thus, an individual could not realistically expect his baggage
to escape these search procedures. Cf. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d at
462, discussed in note 140, supra.
07 Cf. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806, discussed at notes 126-28,
supra, and accompanying text. See also United States v. Chadwick, - U.S. -,
97 S.Ct. 2476 (1977).
-00 "Rit is . . . a constitutional requirement that to be reasonable the search
must be as limited as possible commensurate with the performance of its func-
tions." United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806 (emphasis in original). The
Camara opinion strongly supports this requirement. As has been stated (see text
and notes 188-89, supra, and accompanying text), that opinion found that no
techniques other than the inspection employed would achieve the purpose of the
inspection, and that the searches involved a limited invasion of privacy since they
were not personal in nature. Where the searches are personal in nature, as are
both the metal detector search and the baggage search, a fortiori the least in-
1978]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
detector searches did so on the basis of the "absolutely minimal
invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy,"'  weighed against
governmental interest in preventing hijackings. It follows, there-
fore, that where methods of search which are available, or which
become available, intrude upon the privacy of the individual to a
lesser degree but are still able to accomplish the purposes of the
search, they should be constitutionally mandated.
Since minimally intrusive methods of search are mandated, cur-
rent screening procedures involving the use of metal detectors
should be changed. Under current procedures the passenger is re-
quired to pass through a metal detector to reach the boarding area.
If he activates the metal detector, he is requested to remove any
metal items from his pockets and to walk through the metal detector
again. If this still produces a reaction, the passenger may be sub-
jected to a personal frisk. The presence of metal on the passenger's
person at this point cannot justify the reasonable suspicion that
he is armed, as required under Terry. Therefore, the frisk must
be justified as a continuation of administrative search procedures.'
If a less intrusive method of locating the offending metal is avail-
able, it must be used before the passenger is subjected to a frisk.
From the advent of wide scale usage of the metal detector, small
hand-held metal detectors have been available. In fact, these were
used in some airports until walk-through detectors were installed.
Since the privacy intrusion of this device is less than that involved
in a physical frisk, this or a comparable device should constitute
the next step in the search procedure.1 ' There is an additional
trusive procedure which will stop preventable hijackings should be used. See also
Comment, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, and Alternatives, 40
U. Cm. L. REv. 383, 409-10 (1973); Note, Applying Constitutional Standards to
Airport Security Systems, 5 Loy. (Cin.) U. L. J. 186, 204 (1974); Downing v.
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d
856, 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972), discussed in note 81, supra.
20 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806, discussed at notes 131-33,
supra, and accompanying text.
210 Even assuming that the metal detectors in use today are not activated as
easily as those used in the original screening procedures, they will be activated
by many people who are not armed. Assuming that metal detectors today are 50
times more selective than those in use at the time of the Lopez search, one per-
cent of all passengers will still activate them. This is from 100 to 250 times the
percentage of passengers denied boarding in the studies cited in Lopez. See United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1084. It is submitted that one chance in 100 to
250 is not a reasonable basis for suspicion.
" An example of a change to a less intrusive method of search is the current
COMMENTS
advantage to the use of such a device at this stage of the procedure.
Because it pinpoints the location of the offending metal, it reduces
the possibility for abuse of the airport search procedure." ' By
the use of the hand-held metal detector, the purposes of the screen-
ing system-prevention of hijackings and the carriage of weapons
on airplanes-would be adequately served. At the same time, where
the use of this device precedes any physical frisk, privacy intru-
sions would be reduced.
It may be argued, however, that the sole use of such a device
would not locate nonmetallic explosives passengers might be carry-
ing. Many of the search cases involving discovery of drugs relied
heavily on the possibility that a hijacker might use explosives in
his attempt. 1' This argument, however, ignores the fact that the
initial walk-through metal detector will not reveal nonmetallic
explosives either. 1 ' Thus, to apprehend the hijacker with explosives
on his person, security officers must depend upon the chance that
he will also be carrying a sufficient amount of metal to activate
the metal detector and justify a physical frisk. Absent statistical
evidence that passengers with explosives are also likely to be
carrying sufficient metal to activate the metal detector, this argu-
ment is irrelevant to a frisk under current procedures. Thus, the
explosives argument cannot support current procedures over the
use of hand-held metal detectors. 1'
Furthermore, it may be possible to use instruments which would
use of X-ray equipment for searching carry-on baggage, which has generally sup-
planted the earlier manual search. A second example is the change from hand-
held metal detectors to the walk-through type as these became available in the
early days of the indiscriminate screening procedures.
212 For example, such a device would not be triggered by a nonmetallic con-
tainer of illegal drugs. Therefore the airport security procedure would be less
readily adaptable to the general search without probable cause.
"I For the most extreme example of an attempt to justify a drug search by
the possibility of explosives, see United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.
1973), discussed at notes 74-79, supra, and accompanying text.
214 After the September, 1976, hijacking by Croatian nationalists (see note
181, supra), a TWA security spokesman was quoted as saying that the weapons
detectors currently in use would be incapable of detecting plastic explosives. N.Y.
Times, September 12, 1976, at 23, col. 1.
211 It is significant that no screening procedure publicly proposed or adopted
for airports has found sufficient danger of explosives to require that passengers
submit to a search adequate to reveal explosives possession. It is also significant
that in none of the cases surveyed did any screening system result in the discovery
of explosives. See also note 220, infra.
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detect non-metallic explosives on the passenger's person, and thus
eliminate the danger without depending upon the chance of metal
detector activation. The United States Customs Bureau is currently
testing vapor detectors capable of indicating the presence of illegal
narcotics being smuggled into the country.""6 It is quite possible
that this device could be adapted to detect vapors from non-
metallic explosives, with little further intrusion into the passengers'
privacy. Furthermore, if properly calibrated it would prevent the
carriage of explosives on board airpanes without also producing
the opportunity for abuse which the physical frisk is subject to.
Unfortunately, in view of holdings in the various jurisdictions
examined, it appears unlikely that current procedures will be
changed as suggested here. Incorporating the use of hand-held
metal detectors, combined with the use of vapor detectors, does,
however, reduce the intrusiveness of the screening searches. There-
fore, a strong case for this requirement can be made on the basis
of the constitutional considerations discussed above.
These considerations would also support changes in the pro-
cedures for screening carry-on baggage. The 1976 amendment to
the aircraft security regulations requiring that all checked baggage
be screened for explosives and incendiary devices would bolster
this recommendation for change.1 ' Prior to this amendment, a
passenger was able to protect his privacy interests by checking
luggage he did not want routinely screened.28
Changes in technology since the original imposition of indis-
criminate baggage search have been reflected in the devlopment
of carry-on baggage screening procedures since 1973. Whereas
originally carry-on baggage was! searched by hand, X-ray machin-
ery was put into use when it became available. 1 The change from
manual searches to the use of x-ray machines has certainly resulted
in less intrusion upon the passenger's privacy. It is obvious that
the projection of dense object outlines on a television screen
1
" See Dallas Times Herald, April 20, 1978, § A, at 17, col. 1.
"'See 41 Fed. Reg. 10,911 (1976), amending 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(b).
215 In fact, this option was held to be the basis for implied consent to the
search of carry-on baggage in United States v. Williams, 516 F.2d at 12, discussed
at text and notes 137-39, supra.
2.. Refinements have apparently been made in the X-ray equipment, for there
is much less likelihood that photographic film in baggage searched by X-ray will
be fogged by the search today.
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visible to a limited number of persons is less intrusive than a
security officer's opening the bag and rummaging among the con-
tents in full view of all persons at or near the checkpoint.'
Despite this reduction in the intrusiveness of the baggage
search, however, it is submitted that there is still significant in-
trusion involved in the display by outline of much of the contents
of one's baggage. One reason, albeit not the only one, for carry-
ing objects in one's baggage is to hide them from public view.
The desire to hide contraband is no more likely than the desire
to prevent public view of legitimate possessions. In any event, a
person's exercise of his constitutional right to privacy cannot
raise a presumption of illegality. Because of the significance of
the continued intrusion involved in the baggage searches, less in-
trusive procedures should be adopted as technological advances
are made which will accomplish the legitimate purposes of the
search. A metal detector which can localize metallic objects con-
tained in baggage with enough precision to ignore the metal frame
would be one possibility. Such a development may be possible, as
evidenced by walk-through metal detectors which indicate the
general area of a passenger's body where metal is located. Even
if this is not technologically feasible at this time, metal detectors
currently available should be used. By calibrating the instrument
to react to the mass of metal in a handgun, the purpose of current
X-ray search procedures would be satisfied. The contents of bag-
gage containing little or no metal would not be revealed to
strangers, and thus the passenger's privacy rights would be pro-
2' This change in procedure also shows that the danger of explosives has not
in fact been considered to be particularly great. The X-ray devices currently used
generally show the outlines only of metallic objects or others of similar density
within the baggage examined. It is quite possible to obtain explosives which are
not sufficiently dense to project a suspicious image on the television screen. See
note 214, supra, and N.Y. Times, September 12, 1976, at 23, col. 1. A manual
search of carry-on baggage would be much more likely to disclose such ex-
plosives. CI. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (approving the
conditioning of access to federal buildings on consent to search for bombs).
Nevertheless, the governmental interest in preventing the carriage of such ex-
plosives was not found to be sufficient to require the continuation of the manual
search. See notes 213-15, supra, and accompanying text. In the only reported case
which involved explosives, United States v. Illingworth, 489 F.2d 264 (10th Cir.
1973), the defendant flew from Pocatello, Idaho, to Denver, Colorado, changing
airplanes en route, without discovery of dynamite in his carry-on baggage. De-
fendant was not arrested until after he told ticket agents in Denver about the
dynamite.
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tected to the fullest possible extent. Any baggage activating the
metal detector could then be subjected to X-ray examination.
This X-ray examination would be fully justified as the least possible
intrusion at this step consistent with the prevention of hijacking
and weapons carriage.
As with the personal frisk, the possibility of explosives cannot
justify more intrusive procedures than those proposed. Plastic
explosives in amounts sufficient for the hijacker's purposes would
not be detected by X-ray examination."1 If this danger is deemed
great enough to warrant effective screening, vapor detectors could
be incorporated into the procedures proposed above with little in-
crease in their intrusiveness, and with greatly decreased potential
for abuse compared to current procedures. The primary advantage
of the proposed procedures would be the "absolutely minimal in-
vasion" necessary to accomplish the purposes of the antihijacking
searches. Because the constitutional requirement is minimum in-
trusion consistent with the purposes of the search, present pro-
cedures with respect to carry-on baggage screening should be
amended to incorporate changed technology which would reduce
the intrusion and the potential for abuse.
CONCLUSION
The great public interest in the prevention of hijacking admit-
tedly justifies some level of screening and search of all air pas-
sengers today. It also must be conceded that current procedures
result in relatively small intrusion upon the privacy of those pas-
sengers. However, for the procedures to be strictly constitutional,
they must incorporate the means which result in the least intrusion
consistent with the goal of preventing hijacking. Although current
procedures may have been reasonable as the least intrusive avail-
able at the times they were adopted, they do not necessarily con-
tinue to be reasonable, even assuming that the dangers of hijacking
have not diminished. Rather, as soon as new, less intrusive tech-
niques become available, they are constitutionally required if
equally effective.
No reasonable system of security screening or search will be
absolute in preventing hijacking. For various reasons a certain
2 1 See note 214, supra.
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level of risk will always be accepted. To the extent that a particular
danger is considered too remote to justify more stringent pro-
cedures of general application, this acceptance should be expressly
recognized with respect to all routine screening procedures. Of
course, where a particular passenger is selected for more thorough
search because of "specific and articulable facts," the more strin-
gent procedures may be applied so long as they are reasonable
within the particular factual context.
Although the public interest has been seen since the adoption
of current procedures as warranting effective search for metallic
weapons-generally guns and knives-it has never resulted in
the adoption of general searches of air travelers comprehensive
enough to reveal non-metallic explosives. It is recognized that
there will be specific instances when the facts available to the
security personnel justify a reasonable fear of explosives. This fear
should be tested under Terry, requiring "specific and articulable
facts" to raise such a fear."" Courts should not approve a search
revealing contraband merely because the searching officers claimed
they thought there might be explosives in the passenger's luggage
or on his person. Since current procedures are totally inadequate
for the discovery of explosives, and since there has never been any
sustained use of a procedure adequate to that purpose, the obvious
implication is that this particular risk has been deemed acceptable.
Therefore, courts should be hesitant to accept a claim of fear or
suspicion to justify a more intrusive search which does not in fact
reveal explosives.
Because of technological advances which will effectively further
the purposes of airport security screening with less intrusion, the
search methods in use today may be unreasonable despite their
reasonableness when first adopted. It is submitted that any argu-
ments based on the danger of explosives in favor of current pro-
celures are without substance, both because of the procedures
ineffectiveness in discovering explosives and because of the appar-
ently negligible and accepted danger of hijacking presented by ex-
plosives. Therefore, the equipment and methods used should be,
and indeed are constitutionally required to be, updated today, and
updated periodically in the future as less intrusive but equally
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussed in note 4, supra.
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effective search techniques become available. Specifically, the use of
hand-held metal detectors should precede any physical frisk of
passengers activating the walk-through metal detector. In addi-
tion, metal detector screening of carry-on luggage should precede
X-ray examination of the luggage. Both these changes in current
procedures are constitutionally required as the least intrusive
means consistent with the purposes of the airport security screen-
ing system. Furthermore, any perceived increase in the danger of
explosives should be guarded against, not by continuation of
current procedures, but by the use of vapor detectors and similar
devices which could effectively prevent explosives carriage without
the great potential for abuse which current procedures present
